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BORROWING AND NON-BORROWING AMONG INTERNATIONAL COURTS
National and international judges increasingly communicate with each other and influence each other's interpretations of legal issues (e.g. Glendon 1991; Lester 1987; Slaughter 1994 Slaughter , 2003 Slaughter , 2004 . According to Anne-Marie Slaughter, such "transjudicial communication" has become an integral part of a "new world order" (Slaughter 2004) leading to an emerging "global jurisprudence" created by a "global community of courts" (Slaughter 2003) . While the concept of transjudicial communication has attracted a great deal of interest, 1 most of the literature has sought to advance normative claims for or against the practice, especially with regard to the usage of foreign citations by the U.S. Supreme Court. Consequently, there is little comparative evidence of just how common reliance on external decisions is and what may explain variation in this practice (Black and Epstein 2007) .
I address these issues in the context of international courts. International courts issue
judgments that serve as a source of inspiration for domestic courts. They also borrow from each other and from domestic constitutional courts. These practices are by no means uncontroversial.
Most international courts are delegated the task of interpreting a specific treaty or convention and are often explicitly discouraged from developing broader precedent. On the other hand, without transjudicial communication the proliferation of international tribunals may lead to inconsistent international legal norms given the decentralized and non-hierarchical nature of international law. There are complaints aplenty that international courts rely either too much or too little on each other's decisions. A former president of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in a speech before the UN General Assembly that inter-judicial dialogue is insufficient to resolve inconsistencies between international courts as every institution "[..]has a tendency to go its own separate way" (Guillaume 2000) . Consistent with this sentiment, some argue that the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and Appellate Body (AB) should be more willing to rely on public international law and engage sources other than its founding treaties (e.g. Pauwelijn 2001). By contrast, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) has been accused for being too creative in its use of external judicial decisions, thus undermining political support for the court (Neumann 2008) . The extent to which the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) can, do, and should engage each other's jurisprudence has also been the subject of considerable debate (e.g. Wetzel 2003).
So far, however, there has not been a systematic effort to examine why and how often international judges and courts rely on the judgments of others. This is unfortunate as these issues have broader theoretical implications. The assertion that international legal norms may spread due to semi-autonomous interactions between judges (Slaughter 2004 ) suggests a mechanism for the diffusion of norms different from but complementary to those discussed in the social science literature (e.g. Elkins and Simmons 2005; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Kelley 2004; Risse et al. 1999; Simmons et al. 2006 ). Slaughter stresses the reciprocal character of transjudicial relations and the horizontal nature of the resulting network. Yet, our understanding of (international) judicial behavior and the operation of networks more generally suggest that ideology, authority relations, and strategic behavior may well shape the transmission of legal norms in important ways (e.g. Carrubba et al. 2008 , Voeten 2008 . While this general point is acknowledged by Slaughter and other scholars of transjudicial communication, little effort has been exerted towards systematically analyzing its consequences.
Proponents of foreign citation tend to argue that judges primarily use external case-law in order to improve the quality of their decisions. In addition, judges may vary in their propensities to rely on external sources depending on their judicial ideologies. Following Black and Epstein (2007) , I find that these two arguments are unlikely to account for the variation among courts.
Instead, I suggest that judges use external citations purposively in order to achieve a desired effect with a particular audience. First, following Slaughter, judges may be interested in influencing other courts; giving them incentives to include external citations and to engage in reciprocity (i.e. cite other courts who cite them). Second, judges may take the effect of external citations on state parties into account. External citations may lead to costly charges that judges are exceeding their delegated authority. They also have potential benefits as a persuasive tool, especially in interactions with state parties that are sensitive to arguments that they are noncompliant with international standards. I argue that the expected costs are higher the more consequential decisions are to states and when compliance is not guaranteed but non-compliance is costly. The anticipated benefits are higher when interacting with new or unstable democracies than with authoritarian states or established democracies.
The empirical component of this paper starts with an in-depth analysis of citations to and from the ECtHR followed by a more global analysis of citation patterns between other international courts. The ECtHR is an interesting focal point for several reasons. The court has issued more judgments than all other standing international tribunals. It allows public separate opinions, thus permitting an analysis of the influence of judicial ideology (Voeten 2007 (Voeten , 2008 .
Moreover, the ECtHR draws the most obvious comparisons with the US Supreme Court in terms of the legal issues that come before it. Many of the most controversial foreign citations by the US courts were to ECtHR jurisprudence, so much so that David Zaring (2006) it is also essential not to equate transnational citations with transnational influence. Citations are public acknowledgements of the relevance of another court decision. The purpose of citations is not simply to reflect the thought processes of judges but also to communicate something to an audience. As J.H. Merryman (1977, 381) put it "Presumably a citation means something to the person citing, and presumably he anticipates that it will have some meaning to the reader." As such, a study of formal citations may well underestimate the extent to which judges are influenced by external decisions. For example, Slaughter (1994, 106) suggests that the UN Human Rights Committee has adopted similar styles of reasoning to the ECtHR without acknowledging its influence. At the same time, some citations to foreign courts may be window dressing; attempts to make a decision more persuasive to an audience even if the true motivations for reaching a decision were entirely unrelated to the external sources.
From the perspective of judicial behavior, there are two factors that differentiate citations to courts outside of a court's formal jurisdiction from other citations. First, the chain of delegation that allows judges to rely on external court decisions tends to be implicit at best, 2 thus opening up judges to charges that they are abusing their delegated authority. 3 This is especially so if a court uses external citations to interpret the domestic or treaty law that it was authorized to interpret. 4 Second, judges cite external opinions not as binding legal authority but as a source of persuasive authority (e.g. Glenn 1987 , L'Heureux Dubé 1998 , Slaughter 1994 . This means that judges have considerable discretion in picking the case-law that they wish to ignore, follow, or reject. Moreover, there is evidence that states strategically file trade disputes in the forum where they believe the precedent will serve them best (Busch 2007).
The citation of court opinions outside the formal jurisdiction of a court is both entirely at the 59, to the same effect. This has not inhibited the development by that Court (and its predecessor) of a body of case law in which considerable reliance on the value of previous decisions is readily discernible." (Japan -Alcoholic Beverages II, pp. 12-15, DSR 1996:I, 97, at 106-108) . 8 At least in comparison to domestic courts in developed democracies. There are, of course, numerous domestic courts who operate in a weaker compliance environment than, say, the ECJ. 9 There may also be reasons that norms to adhere to past precedent are not quite as strong in international courts. For example, the ECtHR has developed a "margin of appreciation" doctrine, which posits that countries should have some leeway in how they implement their Convention obligations into their specific domestic contexts (e.g. Yourow 1996) . This leaves judges some room to motivate deviations from case-law with reference to specific national circumstances. 
WHY DO INTERNATIONAL JUDGES AND COURTS CITE EXTERNAL SOURCES?
A. Learning
The law literature suggests that judges primarily cite external opinions in order to improve the quality of their decisions. As Anne-Marie Slaughter puts it in a discussion of why US Supreme Court Justices cite foreign cases:
"For these judges, looking abroad simply helps them do a better job at home, in the sense that they can approach a particular problem more creatively or with greater insight. [..] It provides a broader range of ideas and experience that makes for better, more reflective opinions. This is the most frequent rationale advanced by judges regarding the virtues of looking abroad" (Slaughter 2003, 201) .
Harold Koh (2004) posits that citing foreign sources may serve three functions in informing judicial opinions: they help inform the interpretation of parallel rules, they shed empirical light on legal issues, or they may be used to illustrate how common standards should be applied.
Stephen Calabresi and Stephanie Zimdahl developed a not altogether dissimilar typology that (amongst others) also includes "logical reinforcement cases," in which "in which the Court looks to foreign law and practice to demonstrate that its opinions are logical and are supported by
reason" (2004, 864) .
While these typologies are a useful tool for classifying the different roles that external citations play in judicial opinions, they provide little guidance into why judges or courts may feel that they should or should not include external sources in their opinions, 12 aside from some rather general statements. First, courts that deal with similar legal issues should cite each other more frequently as it allows for more valid comparisons. Second, the presence of prestigious external courts with reputations for high quality decisions should enhance the likelihood of crosscitations. This conception also fits with the image of international judges as professionals to whom states delegate authority in order to benefit from their expertise. This judges as "trustees" model has recently gained traction in the political science literature (Alter 2008) . Third, the "learning hypothesis" by itself implies no reason to expect resistance to the explicit usage of external citations. Quite to the contrary, judges should reinforce that their decisions are rooted in external case-law in order to demonstrate the quality of their reasoning.
B. Judicial Ideology
The role of ideology as a motivating force for the use of external sources is frequently suggested in the U.S. context. As Robert Bork puts it:
"Perhaps it is significant that the justices who [borrow] are from the liberal wing of the Court. This trend is not surprising, given liberalism's tendency to search for the universal and to denigrate the particular" (Bork 2003, 22) 13
On the current U.S. Supreme Court, the most vocal proponents of using foreign decisions indeed come from the liberal camp while the openly skeptical Justices are generally thought to be more conservative. On the other hand, there are also examples of more conservative Justices relying on foreign jurisprudence, including former Chief Justice Rehnquist and former Justice Frankfurter (Black and Epstein 2007) . It is not inconceivable that conservative Justices may find it useful to appeal to foreign law in cases where the domestic status quo is more liberal than the international one. 14 More generally, there is evidence that the ideology of judges matters for their citation practices in the sense that federal judges appointed by Democrats tend to cite other judges appointed by Democrats (Choi and Gulati, n.d.) .
A difficulty with extending the ideology hypothesis to the international realm is that much less is known about the sources and role of judicial ideology on international courts. Recent research on the ECtHR shows that the main source of variation among international judges is the desired degree of deference that should be granted to states in how they implement their international obligations (Voeten 2007) . The ECtHR's margin of appreciation doctrine permits states some leeway in how they adjust Convention rights to national customs and interests (e.g.
Yourow 1995). The judges who believe that this margin should be small ("activists") tend to interpret human rights in a universalistic manner and may be more likely to consider global sources for their decisions. Judges on the self-restraint side of this spectrum show more deference to the raison d'état. These judges are more likely to be diplomats and are more likely to be appointed by governments skeptical of supranational integration (Voeten 2007 (Voeten , 2008 . As such, they may well have a more narrow view of treaty interpretation that makes them less likely to rely on external sources. Similar divisions among judges have also been suggested on the ECJ and WTO (e.g. Steinberg 2004).
The role of ideology in transjudicial communication has been virtually unexplored, which is unfortunate given what we know about judicial behavior and the spread of information in networks more generally. Yet, there are also some inherent limits to the judicial ideology hypothesis. First, data limitations prevent a test on courts other than the ECtHR. Many international courts either do not allow separate opinions or have too few decisions to allow for reliable measurement of ideological variation among justices. Second, the thesis does not provide for a compelling explanation for variation across courts, unless we argue that one court tends to have more "activist" judges than another. This may be so because the state parties to some treaties are more willing to embrace global sources of international law or because the appointment procedures are skewed towards more internationalist judges (Voeten 2009 ). For example, courts where the appointment and re-appointment of judges is controlled by individual states (one state, one judge) may be less likely to contain many judges that are internationalist in their orientation than courts whose judges are appointed through competitive elections in multilateral bodies. For example, judges on international criminal tribunals are much less likely to be diplomats and show much less variation in their background profiles than ECtHR judges (Danner and Voeten n.d.) . 15 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that this type of explanation can account for the wide observed differences in citation patterns among international courts.
C. Strategic Uses of External Citations
Several scholars have suggested that there may be a political or strategic logic underlying constitutional borrowing and the use of foreign law in domestic courts (e.g. Benvenisti 2008; Black and Epstein 2007; Epstein and Knight 2003; Schauer 2000) . Slaughter (2003; ) also points at various points to the possibility that transjudicial communication is shaped by strategic considerations of the participants. The strategic model of judicial decision-making starts from the premise that judges have goals, such as to see the law reflect their policy preferences, to advance their careers, or to enhance the institutional authority of the court on which they serve. Judges operate in an environment in which their ability to achieve these goals depends on the behavior of others, such as other judges and other institutions of government. They therefore behave in ways that takes the anticipated actions of others into account. 16 As argued earlier, citations to external sources are included in decisions not because judges are compelled to do so but because judges believe that they signal something meaningful to an audience. I distinguish three different audiences that judges may aim at: other courts, state parties, and their colleagues.
I. Influencing other Courts
A first strategic account assumes that judges are motivated by influencing other courts.
15 ECtHR judges are elected by the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly from a list of three judges submitted by each government. The Assembly has the right to send back a list of candidates for want of gender parity or qualifications but the decision to nominate candidates remains squarely with state parties. Judges on international criminal tribunals and the ICJ are usually elected by the UN General Assembly with no assurance that any national will be elected. The exception tends to be the five members of the UN Security Council, whose candidates rarely if ever fail to be elected. There is some evidence that P-5 judges differ in systematic ways from non P-5 judges (Danner and Voeten n.d.) . 16 The strategic model has been employed with great frequency in the U.S. context (e.g. Epstein and Knight 2000; Epstein, Knight, and Martin 2001; Eskridge 1991a Eskridge , 1991b Johnson, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2005; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000; Murphy 1964) and to a lesser extent in comparative and international judicial behavior (e.g. Carubba et al 2008, Helmke 2005 , Staton 2006 ). Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004) argues that the key difference between old modes of legal transplantation and new transjudicial communication is that there is now a true dialogue between judges. The current system should be thought of not as a centralized hierarchy in which a few courts exert disproportionate influence but as a community of courts who exchange ideas.
Influence within this system is determined by a willingness to engage others and an ability to reflect an international consensus. Indeed, Slaughter (2004, 74-75) suggests that judges who are unwilling to participate in the transjudicial dialogue will undermine their ability to influence other courts:
".. appellate judges around the world are engaging in self-conscious conversation. This awareness of constitutional cross-fertilization on a global scale ---an awareness of who is citing whom among judges themselves and a concomitant pride in a cosmopolitan judicial outlook -creates an incentive to be both lender and borrower." (emphasis in original).
Such reciprocity is also suggested by others, including some foreign judges who argue that the US Supreme Court is losing its international influence at least partially because of its unwillingness to engage foreign decisions (Barak 2002 , L'Heureux-Dubé 2002 . Schauer (2000) argues suggests that the ICJ will exercise caution in citing other courts. An additional grey area is that many international legal conventions stress the need for uniform application. References to how external courts have interpreted a convention obligation may be justified from the implicit delegation inherent in ratifying such a convention.
III. The Collegial Game
Finally, if justices have policy preferences, they need to convince their colleagues of the merit of their viewpoints. External decisions could be useful in the collegial game if others, or at least the "swing voter," care about conformance with international standards (or the standards set by the particular court that is cited). Conversely, they could be to the detriment of the judge trying to persuade her colleagues if there is active resistance among the pivotal judges to transnational influences. Moreover, if a viewpoint is already carrying the day, there would be no need to include foreign references if only a single judge object to such use. The collegial perspective thus suggests that the role of foreign decisions could be greater in deliberations among judges than is reflected in majority judgments. It does not generate strong predictions about variations among courts.
EXTERNAL CITATIONS BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Overview
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) is by far the most active international court, having issued more than 10,000 judgments over a fifty year period. Aside from a handful of Figure 1 plots the total number of important judgments and the number of judgments that cite an external decision, either as a majority opinion or as a separate opinion. As can easily be discerned from the graph, there has been a slight increase in the number of external citations over time but this increase has not kept pace with the overall increase in judgments.
Figure 1: Number of External Citations and Number of Important Judgments over Time
The remainder of this section evaluates the use and non-use of external citations in greater detail, focusing on citations to domestic constitutional courts, international courts, and the use and non-use of external citations in separate opinions.
B. The ECtHR and Domestic Constitutional Courts
In all, 38 ECtHR judgments made references to U.S. Supreme Court case law. More than half of these (21) 
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, I dissent."
In sum, the ECtHR rarely explicitly relies on the judgments of foreign constitutional courts.
When it does, it does so only in cases involving the UK and only uses decisions from other common law jurisdictions that were already cited in the UK courts. This still matters, because such usage could set a precedent for other European jurisdictions, which it arguably did in the Hirst case. However, as far as I am aware, Hirst is the only ECtHR judgment where decisions of external constitutional courts played a similar role to that in Roper and Lawrence. Moreover, this usage elicited a dissent from prominent court members whose reasoning was not unlike that of Conservative critics of foreign citations in the US.
US Supreme Court decisions do feature more in separate opinions. This signals that at least some judges are aware of US jurisprudence and that US case-law may have played a larger role in deliberations. The absence of formal acknowledgement of that role does suggest the presence of a norm against citing featuring external case-law too prominently. Before turning to a more detailed analysis of this issue, I discuss citations in ECtHR rulings to other international courts.
C. The ECtHR and Other International Courts
The ECtHR referred to the case-law of the IACHR in five majority judgments, all concerning
Turkey. 31 Three of these dealt with the issue of disappearances, all citing the IACHR's landmark
Velásquez Rodríguez decision. The IACHR rulings were mentioned only in passing except for the Kurt judgment, which elicited some controversy. 32 It is plausible that ECtHR judges felt at liberty to use IACHR cases against Turkey because the country is a developing democracy eager to join the EU and because precedent set in disappearance cases is unlikely to worry the advanced democracies. 33 However, this use is also consistent with the learning hypothesis as Velásquez Rodríguez is probably the best-known source of international jurisprudence on disappearances. In the other two cases, the role of the IACHR references in the judgments was minor. 34 By contrast, the IACHR has referred to ECtHR judgments in 60% of its 126 judgments 31 Ergin (no. 6), Akdivar and Others, Kurt, Akkum and Others, Öcalan. 32 Judge Petitti criticized this usage in a dissenting opinion, arguing that: "The majority of the Court speculates on the basis of a hypothesis of continued detention relying on their personal conviction. That, to my mind, is "heresy" in the international sphere, since the instant case could have been decided on the basis of the case-law under Article 5 requiring objective evidence and documents that convince the judges beyond all reasonable doubt; but both documents and witnesses were lacking in the present case. In addition, the Kurt case occurred in a different context to the one that led to the decisions of the Inter-American Court." 33 Note that this argument also holds for the IACHR reference in the the Öcalan case, which concerns the death penalty. 34 Ergin deals with excluding the criminal jurisdiction of military courts over civilians. It was decided unanimously and IACHR jurisprudence was used amongst other international sources to support the court's reasoning. The final was the Öcalan case, a high profile case. IACHR jurisprudence was used among many other sources to make the point that because execution is irreversible, the procedures that guarantee a fair and impartial trial are all the more important.
issues since 2000. 35 It is not unusual for the IACHR to cite a dozen or more ECtHR judgments and discuss their meaning extensively. The case-law that it cites is very diverse in terms of alleged violations and respondent governments. The cited judgments are also often quite recent, suggesting that IACHR judges follow ECtHR jurisprudence closely. While one would expect the IACHR to rely more on the senior court than vice-versa, the observed relationship is unusually asymmetric.
The ECtHR is similarly sparse in citing other international courts. 
D. The Use of External Decisions in Separate Opinions
The observation that citations to external decisions appear more frequently in separate opinions than in the majority part of a judgment warrants further attention. It suggests that at least some judges are well aware of jurisprudence developed elsewhere and perhaps wish that the ECtHR would more explicitly build on that. In ten of the forty cases in which a separate opinion referred to external case-law, it was an explicit response to the majority judgment. In the dissent cited above as in the earlier quoted dissent in Hirst, the dissenting opinion argued that the Court had overstepped the bounds of its 39 The Kadi judgment held that the EU regulation implementing a Security Council Resolution that had placed Kadi on the list whose funds were to be frozen on suspicion of financing terrorism did not sufficiently respect fundamental rights of the appellant. For examples of statements on the significance of this ruling, see the NYU symposium (http://globaladminlaw.blogspot.com/2008/10/nyu-kadi-panel-discussion-in-full.html Figure two plots the difference in mean levels of activism between judges who referred to an external decision in their separate opinion and judges on the same panels who joined the majority or who wrote a separate opinion that did not refer to an external decision. The data for this graph is restricted to separate opinions that cite an external opinion de novo.
43 Note examples.
Figure 2: Mean Levels of Activism for Judges That Did and Did Not Cite External Opinions
The graph illustrates that judges who refer to external decisions in their separate opinions are different ideologically from the judges that refrain from doing so on the same cases. The difference in means is large (.63 standard deviations) and significant (F=18.561, p=.000). The effect also holds in a probit analysis with fixed effects for cases. 44 The effect is robust to including other characteristics of judges in the equation, including their past careers (whether they were diplomats, academics, or former judges). 45 It is also robust to including characteristics of the home states of judges, including their legal origins, levels of civil liberties, and GDP per capita. None of the other variables approached conventional levels of statistical significance in any of the specifications that I estimated, while the effect of activism on using external decisions remained robust and significant.
44 Coefficient is -.41, z-value -4.12, p-value .000 The marginal effect of activism is -.06. N=406. 45 For details on the data, see Voeten (2007) .
E. Conclusions
The ECtHR has not scanned the globe for developing norms but it has remained focused on European norms and values. 46 Compared to the ECtHR, then, the US Supreme Court is not as provincial as it seems when compared to the South African or Canadian courts. It is interesting to note that while scholars and judges attribute the new reluctance of foreign courts to cite U.S.
precedent to the unwillingness of the U.S. Supreme Court to cite international sources; such critiques are not aimed at the ECtHR, the body that is supposedly overtaking the US Court in terms of international influence (see Liptak 2008) . It may very well be that the debate in the US has been more public or that the ECtHR gets a free pass as an international court. Moreover, it is noteworthy that some of the internal debates within the ECtHR are not dissimilar to debates among Supreme Court justices. Observers often motivate the reluctance of US judges to engage foreign law with reference to American exceptionalism. As Steven Calabresi put it: "Like it or not, Americans really are a special people with a special ideology that sets us apart from all the other peoples of the Old and New Worlds" (Calabresi 2006 (Calabresi , 1373 . It seems like at least some Europeans believe that they are a special people with a special ideology too.
A second observation is that judicial ideology matters for the willingness of ECtHR judges to engage international jurisprudence. Ideology is a potentially important consideration for the study of transnational judicial networks as it may introduce bias. For example, it could be that judges who participate in international conferences have systematically different ideologies than those that do not. The finding in this paper is a mere suggestion of larger potential impact of ideology but does suggest that it is a fruitful research avenue. 46 Note that this is consistent with law literature on ECtHR, which stresses that the ECtHR has expressly rejected global universalist ambitions and has focused on its role in the European integration project. (ADD REFERENCES) Third, the limited use of external citations in the majority part of decisions compared to their much more common use in separate opinions suggests that external case-law plays a role in deliberations and that there is a perception amongst many judges that this role should not be acknowledged in majority judgments, perhaps out of fear that this would lead to charges that the judges are exceeding their delegated authority.
A GLOBAL OVERVIEW OF EXTERNAL CITATION PATTERNS***(INCOMPLETE)
This section reports on some initial findings with respect to global citation patterns. The findings reported here are based on secondary sources (Busch 2007 , Miller 2002 , Neumann 2008 and searches in the case-law databases of the ECJ, ECtHR, ICJ, ICTY, WTO, NAFTA, and IACHR. Only the main conclusions are reported here, a more detailed report on the evidence will follow later. These findings are preliminary and should be interpreted with caution.
First, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that courts whose judgments carry direct consequences to states and where compliance is not assured but non-compliance is costly are least likely to use external citations. Aside from the ECtHR, this characterization best reflects the WTO. The WTO regularly cites ICJ rulings but never to interpret the WTO treaties. It virtually never cites other international courts and has never cited any of the regional trade dispute mechanisms (Busch 2007) . NAFTA occasionally refers to WTO interpretations of legal issues.
The characterization also applies reasonably well to the ICJ, which is also historically reluctant to engage external case-law (Miller 2002 ), although such usage may be on the rise.
Second, there is evidence that external citations appear especially attractive to courts whose membership consists mostly of new or less stable democracies. The IACHR is the prime example here (see Neumann) but some initial searches of the case-law of the Andean Tribunal of Justice and the African regional courts suggest a similar pattern.
Third, the evidence suggests that judges are sensitive to subtleties in chains of delegation. ICJ interpretations on the Vienna Conventions are widely cited by international courts. The ECJ is much more likely to cite the ECtHR than vice versa. Moreover, the ECJ has increased its citations to the ECtHR following the Nice Charter.
Fourth, there is no strong evidence for reciprocity. At least at first glance there seems to be no strong relationship that suggests that Courts respond to each other's citations. More concerning is that at the system-level there is evidence of a hierarchy that resembles old modes of legal transplantation more than the supposedly new horizontal forms of transjudicial communication. The most developed courts are the sources of external citations but themselves rarely use them. Note that they also do not cite each other, so the evidence cannot be easily explained away with reference to the "quality" of legal judgments. As such, it appears that the community of international courts does not (yet?) reflect the horizontal network ideal posited by
Slaughter.
